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by
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Traffic congestion is a pervasive worldwide problem. We explain how to harness
existing technologies together with new methods in time-and-location markets
to eradicate traffic congestion along with its attendant social harms. Our market
design for road use builds on congestion pricing and models of efficient pricing
in the electricity sector. The market maximizes the value of a transport network
through efficient scheduling, routing, and pricing of road use. Privacy and equity
concerns are addressed. Transparent price information provides essential infor-
mation for efficient long-term investment in transport.
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1 Introduction
Traffic congestion is a pervasive and growing worldwide problem. Global conges-
tion costs were estimated at about $1 trillion in 2013.1 According to a recent study,
an average driver in the United States spent 42 hours in congestion during peak
hours in 2016, an average driver in Los Angeles spent 104 hours, and an aver-
age driver on the 4.7-mile stretch of the Cross Bronx Expressway in New York
City spent 86 hours (Cookson and Pishue, 2017; Pishue, 2017). Moreover, conges-
tion’s social costs are growing over time. The United States congestion “invoice”
for added costs in terms of fuel and time grew from $42 billion in 1982 to about
$160 billion in 2014 (in 2014 dollars) – almost a threefold increase – in the 471 ur-
ban areas studied by the Texas Transportation Institute (Schrank, Eisele, and Bak,
2015). Similar increases are occurring worldwide as car ownership rises with de-
velopment. Many roads are failing to perform their basic task of safely facilitating
vehicle movement. And the problem is getting worse.
* Peter Cramton (corresponding author): Department of Economics, University of
Cologne, Germany; R. Richard Geddes, Cornell University, Ithaca (NY), USA; Axel Ock-
enfels, Department of Economics, University of Cologne, Germany. Ockenfels thanks the
European Research Council (ERC) for funding under the European Union’s Horizon 2020
research and innovation program (grant agreement No. 741409). This paper reflects the
authors’ view, and the funding agency is not responsible for any use that may be made of
the information it contains.
1 See “The Cost of Traffic Jams,” The Economist, November 3, 2014.
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The instant reaction is often to call for more roads. However, numerous stud-
ies have shown that an increase in road capacity does not relieve congestion. “The
Fundamental Law of Road Congestion” (Duranton and Turner, 2011) states that,
if new unpriced capacity is added, the road will become as congested as it was
before the capacity addition. Indeed, even multibillion investments in new roads in
cities like Los Angeles and Houston did little to reduce commuting times. There is
also little support for the widespread belief that an increase in ride-hailing services
like Uber and Lyft, or in self-driving cars, will cure traffic congestion. Ride-hailing
services appear to increase traffic (Schaller, 2017), which probably contributes to
Uber’s support of road pricing as “the most effective way to manage vehicles on the
road” (Salzberg, 2017), and why Lyft suggests that “congestion pricing [:::] has not
caught on in a big enough way” (Zimmer and Green, 2017). Although self-driving
cars use roads more efficiently, it is not obvious that they will relieve traffic con-
gestion. The associated decrease in costs and increase in the demand for mobility
may swamp the efficiency gain (Fulton, Mason, and Meroux, 2017; Henzelmann
et al., 2017; SBD, 2016). The one approach known to solve the gridlock – and that
advocated by most economists – is congestion pricing.2
Vickrey (1963, 1969) was the first to recommend congestion pricing. He ob-
served that as roads get congested, additional drivers lower the speed of the drivers
behind them. Indeed, as the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA, 2009, p. 6)
explains, the “number of vehicles that get through per hour can drop by as much
as 50 percent when severe congestion sets in. At high-traffic levels, the freeway is
kept in this condition of ‘collapse’ for several hours after the rush of commuters has
stopped.” That is, as a road gets close to its physical limits, even a small increase
in the number of vehicles can lead to a large drop in average speed and throughput.
Dynamic congestion pricing can internalize the costs that are imposed by individ-
ual drivers on the system, and thus maximize throughput at any time. Available
transportation capacity is instead currently allocated by queuing. Queuing is es-
pecially wasteful in transport because the queue degrades throughput, is blind to
drivers’ preferences, and leads to much less predictable and longer travel times.
Efficient road-use pricing generates many additional benefits. It improves en-
vironmental quality, since vehicles operate more efficiently and spend less time
idling. Safety improves due to more consistent, predictable traffic flow. Moreover,
dynamic road prices provide essential information to direct scarce investment re-
sources toward projects where those dollars are most highly valued by road users,
while generating the funds that underlie that investment with nondistortionary taxes
(Geddes, 2011). Additional benefits include: (i) enabling road charges to reflect
social cost, rather than tying road charges to fuel taxes; (ii) adopting the basic
horizontal-fairness principle that the motorists using a road should pay in pro-
portion to use, which enhances social equity; (iii) allowing scarce road space to
2 The complementary nature of self-driving cars, ride-sharing – in carpool form – and
congestion pricing may lead to the bright future we envision (Ostrovsky and Schwarz,
2018), but congestion pricing will play an essential role in inducing the timely adoption
of self-driving cars and carpooling.
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be allocated to motorists who value it most highly at that specified time of day;
(iv) incentivizing technological innovations that reduce the cars’ demand on scarce
road capacity; and (v) encouraging commuters through current road-use prices to
explore the travel alternatives of their choice during peak times.
This list suggests that the social benefits created by dynamic road-use pricing
will be substantial. Yet, when Vickrey proposed his solution, the time was not right
for actual implementation. As Harstad described it,
“Vickrey, though, was appalled at the notion of adding to traffic congestion to collect
tolls, and railed against tollbooths, urging the development of a system where small
radio transmitters would transmit vehicle or driver IDs over a distance of a few feet,
and a computerized system connected to roadbed receivers would calculate liabilities
and bill drivers periodically. A few years afterward, Vickrey was challenged that the
system he proposed was infeasible. He responded in typical fashion: in the mid-
1960s, he first built a rudimentary computer in his home and connected it to a radio
receiver, then limited himself to a $3 budget for parts with which he built a small
radio transmitter placed under the hood of his car. He could then show anyone who
asked a printout of the times his own car went up or down his driveway.” (Harstad,
2008, p. 150)
Now, however, the time is right (Cramton, Geddes, and Ockenfels, 2018b). Ad-
vances in mobile communications make it possible to identify and communicate
the location of a vehicle to within a few centimeters – allowing precise measure-
ment of road use. User preferences can be communicated both in advance to de-
termine scheduled transport and in real time to optimize routes based on current
information. Computer advances facilitate efficient scheduling and pricing of road
use. Consumer apps help road users translate detailed price information into pre-
ferred transport plans. Computers also allow an independent system operator to
better model demand and adjust prices to eliminate congestion and maximize the
total value of road infrastructure.
So far, however, the use of road-use fees is limited. In the U.S., Oregon de-
buted a system-wide user-fee program (Morris, 2015), yet road pricing is most
often limited to new lanes, such as high-occupancy toll (HOT) lanes, or to con-
versions from high-occupancy vehicle (HOV) to HOT lanes. This has left existing
transportation facilities – often older roadways in need of fresh investment – out
of user-fee-generated funding streams. Moreover, only a few small sections of the
U.S. highway system are dynamically priced. Outside the U.S., Singapore, London,
Oslo, Stockholm, and Trondheim, among other cities, have adopted some form of
congestion pricing. However, its application is often limited to a cordon around the
city, or to a small set of roads within, and prices are typically not responsive to
real-time changes in demand or supply.
We explain how to harness existing technological developments which, when
combined with advanced markets in road use, can fully eradicate traffic congestion
along with its attendant social harms. Our proposal represents a significant leap
forward to the most complete and efficient end state for road pricing. We propose
a comprehensive system of direct, variable road-use charges. This creates a mar-
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ket for transport that maximizes the value of a transport network through efficient
scheduling, routing, and pricing of road use.
2 Congestion Pricing for Road Use
Although universal pricing of road use has only recently become feasible, efficient
pricing of network capacity is not new. In restructured electricity markets in the
U.S., energy is priced at each time and at every location in the system. Electricity
supply and demand are scheduled to maximize gains from trade subject to physical
constraints. The prices that support this efficient outcome are (approximate) com-
petitive equilibrium prices – known in the industry as locational marginal prices.
The electricity grid is optimally utilized, and electricity is produced at least cost
and consumed by those valuing it most. Our proposal for road-use markets builds
on this model and on the advances made in the electricity sector.
In the simplest approach, the market for road use is conducted by an indepen-
dent system operator (ISO). The ISO’s mission is to maximize the value of scarce
existing road resources. The key instrument available to the ISO is the ability to
set efficient congestion prices. The ISO models road-use demand and establishes
prices at each congested segment and at each time to maximize the value of the road
network subject to max-flow capacity constraints.3 Usage is monitored and charged
to each user based on the marginal social cost of use.4 The user price depends on
the vehicle-specific demand for road capacity (which depends on the availability
of optimized driving algorithms and enhanced capabilities, such as platooning) and
pollution. Computer apps armed with this price information then guide consumers
in making transport choices consistent with their preferences. For autonomous ve-
hicles, real-time road price data can guide the vehicle’s route decisions without
driver intervention. All of this is possible with existing technology. Indeed, adding
road-use prices to those apps is straightforward (Cramton, Geddes, and Ockenfels,
2018a).
3 System uncertainties mean that the ISO cannot operate the road at 100 percent of
capacity. Some capacity is reserved to handle momentary surges in demand or drops in
supply, as is done in electricity markets. Supply uncertainty arises from road construction,
accidents, and weather; demand uncertainty arises from weather and special events, such
as the end of a football game, as well as other shocks. For related issues surrounding real-
time pricing in the electricity sector see Joskow and Wolfram (2012), and in the airline
industry see McAfee and te Velde (2007). Real-time markets can create complications due
to strategic timing of transactions, which, however, can be dealt with (Budish, Cramton,
and Shim, 2015; Roth and Ockenfels, 2002).
4 Our proposal does not internalize certain externalities that might occur below full
road capacity (e.g., when very fast drivers impose negative externalities on slower
drivers), which are better addressed by other means such as speed limits.
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Figure 1
Wholesale Market Model
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3 A Wholesale Market for Transport
A more sophisticated market design is based on a wholesale market model, as in
electricity markets (Cramton, 2017). In the wholesale market, the ISO has the same
mission – to maximize the value of road use. However, it does so by having service
providers (e.g., Google, Uber, and Lyft) compete for road use in forward markets
as well as in real time. Forward trading mitigates risks. To do this, service providers
will develop user apps and other means that enable users to easily and effectively
express demand. The service providers also guide users, both in scheduling future
demand and in routing during real time. Of course, schedules can change in re-
sponse to unexpected events and new information. The wholesale market for trans-
port can handle such changes efficiently, as is done in U.S. electricity markets.
The market model is portrayed in Figure 1. Users provide the underlying demand
for road use. Service providers compete for users in the retail market. Providers that
offer more attractive plans are likely to be more successful. Large companies, such
as DHL, UPS, and FedEx, will participate directly in the wholesale market.
The product being traded in the wholesale market is the right to use a well-
defined road segment in a specific time slot. Time is broken into discrete intervals,
such as ten minutes, to keep the number of products manageable. The transport
market’s underpinning is the real-time market, which prices road use in real time.
The real-time market is a physical market, based on actual (i.e., physical) road use.
The system operator adjusts the price to clear the market at each time and location.
Effectively, there is an auction to balance supply and demand, where the “bids” in
real time are simply the physical use of the road.
Identifying equilibrium prices and quantities for many interrelated products is
complicated, but it can be done with modern optimization techniques (Milgrom,
2009, 2017). Indeed, the number of congested road segments is limited, the con-
gested segments are highly predictable, and integer constraints do not play an im-
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portant role. The number of vehicles that can travel on a road segment in a ten-
minute interval is at least several hundred, and over one thousand for major high-
ways with three or more lanes. This makes the product a divisible good; it can be
treated as such in forward markets. Further, with demands in forward markets ex-
pressed as piecewise linear curves, the objective of maximizing gains from trade
is quadratic and positive definite. With linear constraints, the problem is readily
solved with standard techniques from convex optimization (Bazaraa, Sherali, and
Shetty, 2013). Feasibility is assured, since zero trade satisfies each trader’s con-
straints. Even for large instances with thousands of products and constraints, the
unique competitive equilibrium prices and quantities that maximize gains from
trade (i.e., value of the network) can be computed in seconds using today’s com-
puters and algorithms.
Since real-time congestion prices tend to be volatile, participants wish to manage
price risks. To mitigate risk and promote efficient scheduling, we propose four
forward (primary) markets: yearly, monthly, weekly, and daily. Forward markets
are financial, not physical. Service providers take positions in forward markets,
while subsequent markets allow adjustment of positions as uncertainty is resolved.
The ISO determines the supply offered in each forward market, consistent with
customers’ and service providers’ interest in taking forward positions. The ISO
offers more supply at higher prices, creating a rising supply curve. The timing
of the sale of forward capacity (yearly, monthly, weekly, daily) is established by
the ISO, consistent with the needs of natural buyers, as is done in U.S. electricity
markets. Service providers bid in forward markets to maximize net value to users
and manage risk. This typically involves purchasing some fraction of user demand
in each of the markets and adjusting positions as demand uncertainty is resolved.
Having multiple opportunities to trade reduces risk to the service provider and
facilitates planning. Forward markets also facilitate price discovery through price
transparency. Finally, forward trading mitigates market power in the real-time mar-
ket by putting wholesale customers and service providers in a more balanced posi-
tion on entering the real-time market.5
Under the wholesale-market model, service providers compete for retail cus-
tomers. Offering a service plan that creates the most value for the consumer is one
form of competition. The most sensible and efficient plans will let the consumer
express a realistic estimate of usage, informed by past driving behavior, then let
5 See, e.g., Wolak (2000) for the argument that forward trading mitigates market
power. In electricity markets, real-time prices are significantly more volatile than day-
ahead prices, because, as we get closer to real time, participants have fewer options to
address shocks to supply or demand. The supply and demand curves that determine price
are steeper – quantity varies less in response to price. While most energy is traded in
advance of real time, the real-time market plays an essential role in efficiently pricing
deviations from day-ahead schedules. Such markets are known to function robustly, even
under extreme stress. For instance, the Texas electricity system withstood the huge shocks
to supply and demand that Hurricane Harvey produced in August 2017: market pricing
and system stability were maintained throughout the multiday event (Cramton, Geddes,
and Ockenfels, 2018a).
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Figure 2
Example of a Retail App
Type Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun
Daily trip ● ● ● ● ●
Round trip One way Mul-stop
Depart Arrive
8:00am 8:28am +10 min 0,45$      -10 min 0,32$      
5:00pm 5:28pm +20 min (0,20)$     -20 min (0,33)$     
+30 min (0,46)$     -30 min (0,59)$     
+40 min (1,11)$     -40 min (1,24)$     
3,76$    +50 min (1,21)$     -50 min (1,34)$     
+60 min (1,40)$     -60 min (1,53)$     
+70 min (1,56)$     -70 min (1,69)$     
+80 min (1,82)$     -80 min (1,95)$     
+90 min (2,01)$     -90 min (2,14)$     
Alternaves and Price Change
Later Earlier
Add to Cart
Home Work
Wed, 1 Nov 2017 Thu, 30 Nov 2017
Begin End
Vehicle
MD 0123
Cost per trip
Home to Work
Work to Home
the consumer purchase this expected usage on a forward basis to reduce exposure
from real-time price volatility. The monthly settlement of such a plan would price
deviations from expected usage using real-time prices. Thus, the consumer is ex-
posed to the real-time price on the margin – as required for efficiency – but most
users’ expenditure would likely be at forward prices.
Service providers would also compete by providing useful apps that help cus-
tomers easily express their preferences. An example retail app is shown in Fig-
ure 2. The app lets the user purchase a trip on a forward basis, which may be either
a one-time trip or a recurring trip at a specified time. In this case, the user is buying
a daily round-trip from home to work for all the weekdays in November. The user
enters his preferred departure times, and the app calculates a cost per trip. The app
also shows how the cost per trip would change if the user departed earlier or later.
4 Promoting Acceptance
Before communities shift to efficient congestion pricing, important questions must
be addressed to overcome opposition in the public and in politics: How does pricing
alter consumer choice? Can privacy concerns be addressed? Can equity concerns
be addressed?
4.1 Trade-Offs in Transport
Road-use pricing will be successful if it delivers tangible benefits. The elimination
of congestion delays will be the most salient benefit driving consumer acceptance.
Traffic congestion comes at huge individual and social costs. Billions of people are
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made significantly worse off from congestion delay and its related harms. More-
over, because road pricing assures max-flow throughput, the capacity on congested
road segments is up to twice as large at the most popular times.
Another key benefit of road pricing is simplified decision making. Absent road
pricing, drivers face uncertainty about trip time. Those uncertainties depend on de-
parture time. Even adding substantial extra time to allow for typical delays may still
result in a late arrival, frustrating not only the driver but others who are counting
on the vehicle’s on-time arrival.
Although uncertainty about travel time is eliminated by efficient congestion pric-
ing, it will create price uncertainty. Price volatility is however lower due to the re-
duced volatility of travel times on previously congested roads. Moreover, the harm
from price risk is less. What matters for the monthly budget is the volatility of the
monthly expense, which is smaller due to the law of large numbers. Price risk can
be further mitigated via forward purchases. In contrast, delay uncertainty requires
drivers who need to arrive on time to take costly actions that exceed the expected
cost of delay – leaving early and experiencing the costly delay.
4.2 Equity and Fairness
Road pricing frequently raises equity concerns in that pricing may benefit the rich
at the expense of the poor. This is a critical question. However, road pricing ben-
efits the entire population; surveys show that resistance to road pricing projects in
operation is particularly low among low-income users.6 One reason for acceptance
of pricing is that pricing maintains max-flow throughput, and the road-use cost paid
by drivers generates revenue, which can be used to build and maintain road infra-
structure and public transit. Moreover, various options to enhance affordability are
available and have been partly implemented, such as a fixed travel allowance for
commuters (Small, 1992), allocating monthly budgets to spend on congestion tolls
(Kalmanje and Kockelman, 2004), and reduction of distortionary taxation (Parry
and Bento, 2001). Although it is true that poorer users are more apt to shift to less
expensive travel times, this implies that low-income households benefit the most
from replacing existing transport taxes with an efficient pricing scheme (Martin
and Thornton, 2017; West and Williams III, 2004; Schweitzer and Taylor, 2008).7
6 For instance, 70 percent of the lowest-income users strongly support San Diego’s
HOT lanes (FHWA, 2008). In Vickrey’s (1969) model, everybody benefits. As he puts it,
“We thus have an example of tax revenue that not only has no excess burden, it has no
burden at all!” (Vickrey, 1969, p. 255). Hall (2018) also gives a simple illustration that
road pricing does not need to create losers: a carefully designed, time-varying toll on a
portion of the lanes of a highway that can make everybody better off, even before the toll
revenue is spent and even with realistic driver heterogeneity. See Cramton, Geddes, and
Ockenfels (2018b) for a further illustration. On the other hand, Arnott and Small (1994)
and Parry and Bento (2001) show that, under certain conditions, many drivers may not
want to support congestion pricing solely based on resulting travel-time savings in the
short run.
7 For a similar reason, the poor are likely better able to take advantage of profit op-
portunities that arise in markets for road use near real time because of supply or demand
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Other options include “grandfathering” vouchers to poor or needy people, which
they could then either use themselves or sell on the market.8
Viewing road-use pricing as unfair implies that the status quo is believed to be
fairer. But if we had started with a market for road use, there would be fairness
arguments against switching to free road use; e.g., paying the same price regard-
less of whether the driver contributes to traffic gridlock or causes more emissions
in densely populated areas is unfair; that rich people drive more and so benefit
more from eliminating road charges is unfair; that poor people suffer more from
increased traffic externalities is unfair; that all affected by the switch suffer from
traffic jams is unfair. Indeed, once congestion pricing can be established, it often
gains strong support. Eliasson (2014, p. 16) describes how the attitudes changed
“from fiercely hostile to overwhelmingly positive” after Stockholm introduced con-
gestion charges.9
The norm of a market-based economy is for consumers to buy goods and services
at competitive market prices. This is true even for essential services such as water,
gas, electricity, and communications. The nonpricing of roads stems from the fact
that roads were originally uncongested, and that pricing, collecting, and enforcing
payments was too costly. In today’s urban areas, those arguments to avoid pricing
are no longer valid.
4.3 Privacy
Road pricing also raises privacy concerns. Monitoring and enforcement require that
the system operator knows the location of each vehicle during use. Technically this
is easy. Each vehicle would have a device for this purpose,10 and there would be
stiff fines for vehicle operation with a nonfunctioning device. But users may be
concerned that the location information would be inappropriately used – an inva-
sion of privacy. However, nearly everyone with a smart phone uses at least one
map app and nearly everyone agrees to give the map app this location information.
shocks. For example, a poor commuter may buy a monthly pass to commute at her pre-
ferred time, thereby locking in an attractive price per trip of $10. On occasions when
there is a lane closure the real-time price may surge to $30. The poor commuter may opt
to take public transit on such days and earn $30 per event (her forward purchase would
automatically be sold in real time for $30).
8 Extreme surge prices in exceptional circumstances seem unacceptable to many (Kah-
neman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1986; Irwin, 2017). To further promote acceptability, the
market design could include special rules for well-defined exceptional circumstances, as
we also see them in other markets.
9 As Eliasson (2014, p. 2) describes in detail, “congestion charges overcame fierce
initial hostility, survived a heated and complicated political and legal process, including
a referendum initially forced through by opponents to the charges, and has eventually
gained support by more than 2/3 of the population. The Stockholm charges went from
‘the most expensive way ever devised to commit political suicide’ [:::] to something that
the initially hostile media eventually declared to be a ‘success story’.”
10 Singapore has already procured such devices for every vehicle in Singapore, begin-
ning in 2020 (LTA, 2016).
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This consent is given with the belief that the information, on balance, will be used
to help, not hurt, the user. The same could be done for measuring road use. The
system operator would have strict rules about how the information is used. The
information would be used only to meter road use for purposes of scheduling, rout-
ing, and pricing. No individual data would be shared with others. Controls would
be in place to assure that the information policy is followed, and the data remained
secure. Indeed, modern cryptography makes it possible for the system operator to
run the market without any human having access to the individual data and still
prove that the market rules are faithfully followed (Parkes et al., 2008; Parkes, Ra-
bin, and Thorpe, 2009; Parkes, Thorpe, and Li, 2015; Thorpe and Parkes, 2007,
2009).
5 Conclusion
Traffic congestion is one of the biggest challenges of modern societies. Worldwide
congestion costs are estimated at about $1 trillion per year, and traffic is expected
to only become worse over the next years and decades. The Fundamental Law of
Road Congestion implies that building or widening new roads, or other supply-
based policies, will not solve the problem. Thus, under existing policies, traffic is
getting worse and will inevitably end in a crisis.
Fortunately, technological advances allow us to largely eliminate congestion
through efficient congestion pricing, which eliminates the inefficiency, frustration,
and unfairness that comes with the current system. Congestion pricing for road use
is apt to be introduced gradually as technology evolves and opportunities for imple-
mentation are identified. In the simplest approach, an independent system operator
models demand and computes real-time prices for road use to maximize the value
of road use. Prices on congested road segments are set to induce demand to elimi-
nate the congestion and maximize throughput. User-friendly computer apps armed
with this price information then guide consumers in making transport choices con-
sistent with their preferences. Equity and privacy concerns can be effectively dealt
with.
In a sense, responding to prices in transport is nothing new. Today one’s “price”
is paid in throughput reduction and delay cost. Users do respond to this price,
but the price is waste and is set incorrectly – the delay cost does not reflect the
negative externality one user imposes on others. In the market model, congestion
is eliminated: the real-time price is set at the marginal value of demand at the point
of supply and demand balance.
Congestion pricing is not a novel concept. Similar variable charges have been
successfully utilized in transport and many other industries. For example, air fares,
cell-phone rates, electricity rates, room rates at hotels and resorts, train fares, and
some local transit systems use variable pricing. Empirical studies strongly confirm
the effectiveness and efficiency of pricing mechanisms to address traffic congestion
(Cramton, Geddes, and Ockenfels, 2018a). In transport, demand response takes
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one of four forms: (i) time shifters, who shift transport to a less congested time;
(ii) route shifters, who shift to a less congested route; (iii) mode shifters, who de-
cide to take a train, bus, or bike, rather than drive; and (iv) curtailers, who decide
to ride-share, work at home, or otherwise reduce demand. Experimental evidence
such as Lopez (2017), controlled field studies such as Martin and Thornton (2017),
and naturally occurring data such as Eliasson (2014) and Foreman (2016) provide
evidence that drivers strongly respond to congestion prices, and thus suggest that a
market for road use, as we envision it, would work well.
A more sophisticated market design, built on congestion pricing, is based on
a wholesale market model, as we see in electricity markets. The advantage of a
wholesale market is that it allows relatively easy entry as a service provider. The
ensuing competition among service providers then promotes innovation. That in-
novation helps service providers to better understand user demands, translate user
demands into bids in the wholesale market, and develop forward trading strategies
to mitigate risk. Although this market involves complex optimization, the problem
is made easier by the limited number of bottlenecks and the large number of ve-
hicles. The latter reduces the importance of integer constraints in the optimization
problem, making it more likely that efficient congestion prices exist. Another help-
ful factor is that aggregate traffic patterns tend to follow a predictable cycle – this
greatly facilitates the system operator’s modeling of demand.
Modern mobile communications allow road use to be monitored and charged
based on real-time scarcity. Doing so gets the most out of our existing transporta-
tion infrastructure and simultaneously provides essential funding for roads as well
as valuable price information to evaluate road enhancements. This is the inevitable
future of roads.
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